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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional tort litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has generally
increased over the past forty to fifty years,' particularly after the Supreme
Court's decisions in Monell v. Department of Social Services and Owen v. City of
Independence. These decisions authorized and expanded, respectively, the
liability of municipalities under § 1983. Plaintiffs can now bring claims against
municipal officials or municipalities themselves for constitutional violations
committed under color of law, and frequently they bring claims against both.'
One empirical study finds that approximately 82% of constitutional tort cases
involve multiple defendants,4 which usually means a government entity has
been sued along with one or more of its officials. That statistic is consistent
with the experiences of an attorney in the New York City Law Department,
who reported that out of approximately 1250 § 1983 lawsuits then being
handled by the Department's Special Federal Litigation division, the vast
majority named the City and one or more officials as defendants.'
Because many of the same facts and elements relate to § 1983 claims against
municipalities as to § 1983 claims against municipal officials in their individual
capacity, the same legal team frequently will defend both a municipality and its
official in a § 1983 case.6 This dual representation creates significant potential
1. See MICHAEL AVERY, DAVID RUDOVSKY & KAREN M. BLUM, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND
LITIGATION § 1.1 (2002), available at WL POLICEMISC s 1:1; Theodore Eisenberg, Section
1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 523 (1982)
(discussing the growth of § 1983 litigation).
2. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (198o); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978); see JAMES T. TURNER, HANDBOOK OF HOSPITAL SECURITY AND SAFETY 30 (1988)
("[Monell and Owen] have paved the way for the significant increase in the use of Section
1983 as a remedy for the abuse of police power."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM lOO-O1 tbl.4.2 (1999).
3. E.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
4. David K. Chiabi, Police Civil Liability: An Analysis of Section 1983 Actions in the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York, 21 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 83, 89 (1996).
5. Telephone Interview with Muriel Goode-Trufant, Chief, Special Fed. Lifig. Div., N.Y. City
Law Dep't (Dec. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Goode-Trufant Interview].
6. See Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1984); Goode-Trufant
Interview, supra note 5; Memorandum from Dennis J. Herrera, City Att'y, Office of the City
Att'y, City & County of S.F., on Client of the City Attorney, to Mayor-Elect
Gavin Newsom 2 (Dec. 12, 2003), http://www.sandiego.gov/charterreview/pdf/deo/
o7o9o7citysfmemocityattorney.pdf [hereinafter Herrera Memorandum]. In some cases,
state or local law requires or encourages this dual representation. See, e.g., Dunton, 729 F.2d
at 907.
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for conflicts of interest to arise between the municipality as an entity and its
individual officials.
The courts that have recognized this issue have seen it as a powerful
problem. Thus, a number of courts have called for special sensitivity to the risk
of conflicts of interest in § 1983 suits in which a municipality and its official are
dually represented by municipal attorneys. 7 Several courts have noted that the
threat of a conflict of interest is inherent in § 1983 cases because of the
incompatible defenses that can be asserted by the municipality and by its
officials ;8 a few even call the threat "imminent" and "serious."'
The consequences of these potential conflicts of interest may be severe.
When plaintiffs recover damages in § 1983 actions, the awards can be
staggering."° Even settled cases generally result in damages." And even if
compensatory recovery against a municipal official is lower than it would be
against a municipality, 2 officials still must worry about the possibility that the
jury will award substantial punitive damages against them.' Moreover, when a
plaintiff sues a municipal official in his individual capacity, courts levy the
7. E.g., Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3 d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493-94 (ioth Cir. 1996); Ross v. United States, 91o F.2d 1422, 1432
(7th Cir. 199o); Marderosian v. Shamshak, 17o F.R.D. 335, 34o (D. Mass. 1997).
8. E.g., Patterson v. Balsamico, 44o F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2006); Arthur v. City of Galena, No.
04-2022-KHV-DJW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *10-11 (D. Kan. June 2, 2004);
Minneapolis Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
9. Dunton, 729 F.2d at 907; Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 495 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980);
Smith v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. 1O8O, lO87 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Shadid v. Jackson, 521
F. Supp. 87, 89 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
1o. See ALTHEA LLOYD, MONEY DAMAGES IN POLICE MISCONDucT CASES: A COMPILATION OF
JURY AWARDS AND SETrLEMENTS 5 (1983); Chiabi, supra note 4, at 92; Theodore Eisenberg
& Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641
(1987); Stephen F. Kappeler & Victor E. Kappeler, A Research Note on Section 1983 Claims
Against the Police: Cases Before the Federal District Courts in 199o, 11 AM. J. POLICE 65, 71
(1992).
ii. See Chiabi, supra note 4, at 92, 100.
12. Of course, if juries assume that municipal officials will be indemnified, they might render
higher compensatory awards against the officials than they otherwise would. See Martin A.
Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnijy Officer's 5 1983 Liability
for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IowA L. REv. 1209, 1243-46 (2001).
13. E.g., Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 472 (3d Cit. 1992) (upholding a jury's
punitive damages award of over $6oo,ooo across three individual defendants).
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damage award against the official's personal assets; 14 a single finding of
liability under § 1983 can bankrupt an official.'"
With such high amounts at stake, there can be great temptation or pressure
for a municipal attorney to favor one or the other of her clients when their
interests come into conflict. In light of the strong relationships between
municipal attorneys and municipalities as compared to those between the
attorneys and individual officials, municipal attorneys not infrequently may
favor the municipality's interests despite ethical obligations to do otherwise.
Sadly, because § 1983 municipal liability doctrine is rather complex, many
officials may not realize when their attorneys have subverted their interests,6
and courts may not realize either unless someone brings the issue to their
attention. A court instead may assume the municipal attorney made various
strategic choices simply because the evidence in the case supported those
choices.
Thus, despite their importance, conflicts of interest in municipal dual
representation are "frequently overlooked by litigants" in § 1983 cases, and the
issue "has received scant attention in appellate opinions."' 7 Legal scholarship
has also left this topic virtually unaddressed. 8
14. See Kentuckyv. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
15. Cf William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and Its
Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1129 (1996) (referring
to the effect of "the pall of personal liability" on federal employees).
16. E.g., Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. AVERY ET AL., supra note 1, § 4.26, available at WL POLICEMISC s 4:26; see Gordon v.
Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1199 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986).
18. A few works mention conflicts of interest in dual representation of governments and their
officials, but do not analyze the specific sources of these conflicts (for example, the
conflicting defenses available to municipalities and their officials in § 1983 suits) in much
depth. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 84-85 (1983). Most recent legal scholarship on dual representation conflicts has
failed to mention municipal dual representation, see, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Three's a
Crowd: A Proposal To Abolish Joint Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387 (2001), with the
exception of two brief student notes, both published in 1997. One of these notes focused
almost exclusively on the Tenth Circuit's 1996 decision in Johnson v. Board of County
Commissioners. Ann M. Scarlett, Note, Representing Government Officials in Both Their
Individual and Official Capacities in Section 1983 Actions After Johnson v. Board of County
Commissioners, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327 (1997). The other primarily described how
municipal conflicts of interest impact various stages of § 1983 litigation. Nicole G. Tell,
Note, Representing Police Officers and Municipalities: A Conflict of Interest for a Municipal
Attorney in a 5 1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2825 (1997). Both propose
banning municipal dual representation, Scarlett, supra, at 1327; Tell, supra, at 2828, an
approach that this Note evaluates and rejects.
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To remedy the gap in the literature, this Note examines more closely the
nature of the conflicts of interest that arise when a municipal attorney defends
both a municipality as an entity and a municipal official sued in his individual
capacity against § 1983 claims for damages predicated on the same facts. The
Note proposes a solution to assist the municipal attorneys who litigate such
claims and the courts that hear them.
Part I explains the features of municipal dual representation that most
often give rise to conflicts of interest. Specifically, it examines how
incompatible defenses available only to the municipality, or available only to its
official, may pressure attorneys to assert defenses that advance the interests of
one client at the expense of the other-a course of action likely to favor the
municipality over the municipal official.
Part II discusses and evaluates existing approaches to prevent these
conflicts of interest, and to handle them after they arise. It particularly focuses
on three main approaches that courts have employed: (1) imposing per se bans
on dual representation, (2) waiting until actual conflicts of interest arise before
intervening to impose requirements, and (3) requiring municipalities to make
advance commitments that align the interests of the municipality and its
officials.
Part III proposes a hybrid solution to address problems associated with
these conflicts of interest while preserving municipal officials' access to
attorneys and minimizing taxpayer expense. The proposal recommends that
municipal attorneys more explicitly inquire into potential conflicts in particular
cases upfront, and obtain specific informed consent to the potential conflicts
from each client at the outset of the litigation. Where the potential conflict does
not yet pose a "significant risk" of materially limiting the attorney's
representation, dual representation may continue, and if the municipal official
chooses not to be dually represented, he should pay for his own counsel
regardless of the municipality's obligation to pay for his outside counsel in the
event of a conflict. If the potential conflict comes to comprise a "significant
risk," the municipal attorney must obtain further consent for dual
representation to continue; if such consent is not given, the municipality must
either permit separate representation (and pay for the official's outside counsel
if state or municipal law so requires) or align its interests with those of its
official. Finally, in the event that a municipality and its official choose
definitively to assert conflicting defenses, no waiver of the conflict should be
permitted and the municipality should be required to permit separate
representation (and pay for the official's outside counsel if state or municipal
law so requires) or to align its interests with those of its official.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN DUAL
REPRESENTATION OF MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR OFFICIALS
A. The Municipal Liability Landscape
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "every person" under color of state law who
deprives a person within U.S. jurisdiction of rights secured by the Constitution
or certain federal laws shall be liable to the party injured.19 Congress enacted
§ 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,2 ° but courts have only firmly
established municipal liability under § 1983 over the last thirty years.2 Indeed,
between 1961 and 1978, the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape"
precluded the liability of municipalities, and of municipal officials sued in their
official capacity,23 under S 1983. It was only in 1978 that the Supreme Court
overturned Monroe in Monell v. Department of Social Services, which held that
municipalities in fact constitute "persons" for the purposes of § 1983 .'
Meanwhile, it had been clear even before Monell that municipal officials,
when sued in their individual capacity,"5 constitute "persons" under § 1983.26 As
one example, even as the Court in Monroe dismissed the § 1983 complaint
against the City of Chicago because the City was not a "person," it reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the complaint against the individual city officials.
2 7
For the most part, the elements of a § 1983 claim against a municipality are
identical to the elements of such a claim against an individual municipal
official. Against both types of defendants, plaintiffs must prove (1) that the
deprivation of a federally protected right occurred, (2) that a particular person's
(or persons') conduct caused the deprivation, and (3) that the conduct was
19. 42U.S.C. S 1983 (2006).
2o. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1983).
21. See Dunton, 729 F.2d at 907 .
22. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
23. Suits against municipal officials in their official capacity are treated as suits against the
municipality, and damages are awarded from the municipality's funds. See Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
24. 436 U.S. 6S8 (1978).
25. For the remainder of this Note, when I refer to suits against municipal officials, I am
referring to § 1983 suits for damages against municipal officials in their individual capacity,
unless otherwise indicated.
26. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253 (9 th Cir. 1974).
27. 365 U.S. at 192.
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committed "under color of law."2s I will refer to these requirements as the
"deprivation" requirement, the "causation" requirement, and the "under color
of law" requirement, respectively.
There is one additional element of a § 1983 claim against a municipality not
required for a claim against a municipal official. When suing a municipality,
the plaintiff must additionally prove the deprivation of his federal right
occurred as a result of the enforcement of a municipal policy or custom, 9
which I will refer to as the "policy or custom" requirement.3 ° This requirement
finds its genesis in the Supreme Court's holding that municipalities, unlike
private employers,31 cannot be held liable for their employees' actions within
the scope of employment under a theory of respondeat superior. 2 Instead,
municipal liability attaches under § 1983 only if deliberate3 action attributable
to the municipality itselfP4 is the "moving force"3 s behind deprivation of the
plaintiff's federal rights.s6
The municipality will most plainly be liable when an established municipal
policy harmed the plaintiff. Policies embodied in a "policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated" by the
municipality's main lawmaking body obviously qualify. 7 Yet many other
things can constitute municipal policies under § 1983. To comprise a municipal
policy, "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action [must be] made from
among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible [under state
28. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES: 2007-1 SUPPVENT, 5 1.04[A], at 1-17 to -18 (4 th ed. 1997); SWORD AND
SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 4 (Mary Massaron Ross &
Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter SWORD AND SHIELD]. Most Supreme
Court cases list only two main elements of a § 1983 claim because they group multiple
elements together. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
29. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
30. The "policy or custom" requirement has met significant criticism. See, e.g., City of Okla.
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 8o8, 8 34-42 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Larry Kramer & Alan 0.
Sykes, Municipal Liability Under 5 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REV.
249, 254-55, 259-63; Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons
from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 1753 (1989).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 & cmt. b (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS S 895E cmt. c(2) (2006).
32. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 n.7, 691.
33. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion).
34. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
35. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
36. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997).
37. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
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law] for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
question." 8 Officials who possess final policymaking authority with respect to
the subject matter of their position include some local sheriffs and police
chiefs,39 some city councils, 4° some mayors, 41 some heads of agencies,42 and
some other high-ranking local government officials. Additionally, in some
cases, higher-ranking officials may delegate final policymaking authority to
lower-ranking officials to take certain actions, 43 or may ratify lower-ranking
officials' actions after the fact,44 rendering those actions as "policies." Only for
officials with final policymaking authority can a single edict or act constitute a
municipal policy under § 1983.4s
Liability can also attach when a municipal custom deprives the plaintiff of
rights. To constitute a "custom," a practice need not have received formal
approval through any governmental body's official decisionmaking channels, 46
and it may contradict local law or regulations, 47 though it must be "permanent
and well settled. '48 "Whether a practice is sufficiently persistent to constitute a
custom [will] depend on such factors as how longstanding the practice is, the
number and percentage of officials engaged in the practice, and the gravity of
the conduct. '49 A policymaker must have actual or constructive knowledge of
the unconstitutional practice and must acquiesce in its continuance for it to
constitute a "custom" under § 1983.50
38. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84; see City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 8o8, 823 (1985).
39. E.g., Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 12o8, 1223 (1ith Cir. 2005); Turner v. Upton County, 915
F.2d 133, 137 (5th Cir. 199o).
40. E.g., Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1343 (ith Cir. 1994).
41. E.g., Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 331 (2d Cir. 2004); DePiero v. City of
Macedonia, 18o F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1999).
42. E.g., Altman v. City of Chicago, No. 99 C 6496, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16632, at *7 (N.D.
IN. Oct. 24, 2000).
43. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483; Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 138o, 1387 (4 th Cit. 1987).
44. City of St. Louis v. Prapromik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).
45. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123; Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469.
46. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 69o-91 (1978).
47. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130-31; e.g., Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cit. 1986);
Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1o63, 1o67, 1O69 (3d Cit. 1986).
48. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
49. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMs AND DEFENSES § 7.16, at 79
(2003).
5o. E.g., Am. Postal Workers Union, Local 96 v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cit.
2004); McNabola v. Chi. Transit Auth., lo F.3d 5O1, 511 (7th Cir. 1993).
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The Supreme Court has further recognized an alternative route to proving
1983 municipal liability: the plaintiff can demonstrate that the municipality's
inadequate training policies caused the deprivation of his protected rights."s To
proceed in this manner, the plaintiff must show that the municipality's failure
to train reflects deliberate indifference to its inhabitants' rights, and that the
failure to train actually caused the deprivation at issue in the case. 2
The plaintiff must identify a specific deficiency in the municipality's
training program.13 Because of the policy or custom requirement, a
municipality-unlike an individual official-may defend a § 1983 action by
claiming that no such policy or custom existed. This is the first difference
between the standards for § 1983 liability of municipalities and those for their
officials that gives rise to a high likelihood of conflicts of interest in dual
representation.
The second important difference in liability standards for municipality
defendants and municipal official defendants is the defense of qualified
immunity. Supreme Court precedent has clearly established that municipal
officials, but not municipalities, may assert the qualified immunity defense. s4
The current standard to determine whether an official may plead qualified
immunity against a § 1983 claim for civil damages is whether he was
"performing [a] discretionary function[]" and his "conduct d[id] not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."5' Qualified immunity is presently available to
officials only for actions taken within the scope of their official duties. s6
The last relevant difference between the § 1983 liability of municipalities
and their officials regards the availability of punitive damages. Simply put,
juries can award punitive damages against municipal officials, s7 but not against
municipalities. s8 An official may be liable for punitive damages when his
conduct "is outrageous, because of [his] evil motive or his reckless indifference
to the rights of others .... [P]unitive damages in tort cases may be awarded
not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness,
S1. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
52. Id. at 388, 391-92.
53. Id. at 391.
54. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163
(1993); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
55. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 818 (1982).
56. Id. at 819 n.34; e.g., Hogan v. Twp. of Haddon, 278 F. App'x 98, 104 (3d Cir. 20o8); Dunn v.
City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2003).
57. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
ss. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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serious indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even gross
negligence."5 9
B. The Conflicts of Interest in Municipal Dual Representation
This Section describes how the different defenses available to
municipalities and to their officials identified in Section I.A. may be
incompatible, and thus how they give rise to conflicts of interest. It also
describes some of the difficulties associated with rectifying these conflicts of
interest once they arise.
1. Model Rule 1.7(a) and Concurrent Conflicts of Interest
When a municipal attorney simultaneously defends both a municipality
and an official in a suit involving § 1983 claims against them based on the same
set of facts, there is real potential for a concurrent conflict of interest as defined
by Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and its state
equivalents.6° Model Rule 1.7(a), which defines a "concurrent conflict of
interest," reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A
concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
5g. Smith, 461 U.S. at 46-48 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979)).
6o. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2008). As of April 2009, Model Rule 1.7 had
been adopted almost verbatim or reproduced in substantially similar form by the vast
majority of states (forty-five states) and the District of Columbia. E.g., D.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2007); ILL. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7
(2009); MAss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). "Substantially similar form" means
that the slight differences between the state's rule and Model Rule 1.7 are irrelevant for the
purposes of this Note. New Jersey's rule is almost identical except that it precludes
municipalities from consenting to concurrent conflicts of interest. N.J. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). New York's rule is similar to Model Rule 1.7 but it prohibits the
attorney from representing multiple clients without written informed consent if "the
representation will involve the lawyer in representing differing interests." N.Y. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009) (emphasis added). California forbids lawyers from
representing clients whose interests "potentially conflict" or "actually conflict" without
written informed consent. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(C) (2009). Note that
for § 1983 suits in federal court, the rules of the state in which the federal district court is
located generally will apply. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ i cmt. b (2000).
l19:86 2009
MUNICIPAL DUAL REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.6 '
Dual representation of municipalities and their officials does not usually
produce situations in which the clients' interests are "directly adverse" within
the meaning of Rule 1.7. Direct adversity in civil litigation generally implies
either that one client is a plaintiff while another is a defendant in a single
lawsuit, 62 or that one client is a witness against another, 61 and neither generally
occurs in municipal dual representation.
Instead, municipal dual representation frequently fits the description of a
concurrent conflict of interest contained in Model Rule 1.7(a) (2) -that is, there
is often a significant risk that the conflict will materially limit the lawyer's
ability to serve both clients. As Comment 23 to Rule 1.7 clarifies,
[S]imultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation
may conflict, such as . . . codefendants, is governed by paragraph
(a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the
parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing
party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of
settlement of the claims or liabilities in question.6 4
While the possibility exists for substantial discrepancy in testimony or
different possibilities of settlement, the primary potential for a "material
limitation" conflict in municipal dual representation lies in the high likelihood
of "incompatibility in positions," as courts have begun to recognize.
2. The Incompatible Defenses
As Section I.A. discussed, the two most important differences in the
defenses available to municipalities and their officials are as follows: (1) a
municipality, but not an official, can defeat § 1983 liability by disproving the
existence of a municipal policy or custom that caused the deprivation of the
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2008).
62. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WiLLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIT, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 11.8, at 11-22 (3d ed. Supp. 2004).
63. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2008).
64. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 23 (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs rights; and (2) an official, but not a municipality, can defeat § 1983
liability by asserting qualified immunity. These defenses ultimately may prove
incompatible in a few ways.
First, an official's attempt to establish qualified immunity will usually
require that the official show that he was acting within the scope of his official
duties, 6s but the evidence introduced on this front may help to show that he
was acting pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Meanwhile, just as the
official has incentive to show that he was acting within the scope of his duties,
the municipality has incentive to show that the official was acting outside the
scope of his official duties, in order to support its claim that no municipal
policy or custom existed to give rise to § 1983 liability. 66 The Second Circuit
succinctly explained this incompatibility in Dunton v. County of Suffolk:
A municipality may avoid liability by showing that the employee was
not acting within the scope of his official duties, because his unofficial
actions would not be pursuant to municipal policy. The employee, by
contrast, may partially or completely avoid liability by showing that he
was acting within the scope of his official duties. If he can show that his
actions were pursuant to an official policy, he can at least shift part of
his liability to the municipality. If he is successful in asserting a
[qualified] immunity defense, the municipality may be wholly liable
because it cannot assert the [qualified] immunity of its employees as a
defense to a section 1983 action.67
There are several ways that the question of whether a municipal official was
acting within or outside the scope of his duties may relate to the question of
whether a municipal policy or custom existed. For example, a municipal official
who acts outside the scope of his duties is less likely to have final policymaking
authority with respect to his actions because his actions can more easily be
characterized as "purely personal" rather than occurring in areas over which
state law has given him final policymaking authority.68 If he lacks final
policymaking authority with respect to his actions, then his isolated acts cannot
65. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66. See Manganella v. Keyes, 613 F. Supp. 795, 797 n.1 (D. Conn. 1985).
67. Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1984). Courts discussing conflicts
of interest in municipal dual representation often quote Dunton's influential passage. E.g.,
Patterson v. Balsamico, 44o F. 3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 20o6); Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142,
1147 (7 th Cir. 1987).
68. Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 41 (2d Cir. 2oo8); see, e.g., id. at 37; Bennett v. Pippin,
74 F.3d 578, 581, 586 (5th Cir. 1996).
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be characterized as a policy or custom.6 9 As another example, the municipality
may use facts that show that the official acted outside the scope of his duties in
order to demonstrate that municipal policy or custom did not cause or was
otherwise not the "moving force" behind the deprivation of the plaintiffs
rights. 0
To be sure, asserting that the municipal official was off-duty or acting
beyond the scope of his duties may also support a defense that both
municipalities and their officials can assert: that the official was not acting
under color of law. 7' Yet this defense is often unsuccessful because courts
frequently hold that even off-duty officials or those who act beyond the scope
of their duties are acting under color of law if other indicia are present-for
example, if the official were wearing his badge at the time or using municipal
equipment or his official position to deprive the plaintiff of rights.
72
Nevertheless, municipalities may be more willing than their officials to assert
the defense on the chance that it might be successfl because municipalities do
not face the main risk of this defense 73 -losing eligibility for qualified
immunity-that municipal officials do.74 Thus conflicts can occur in the many
cases in which an official would be better off asserting that he was acting
within the scope of his duties.
The second potential incompatibility between the municipality's desire to
assert a "policy or custom" defense and the official's desire for qualified
immunity arises from the potential for the municipal official to claim that he
was "just following orders." At least seven circuits have decided that while
"following orders" does not automatically excuse a municipal official from
liability -particularly if he violates an unambiguously established right-
plausible instructions from a superior official, or sometimes even from a fellow
69. See supra notes 38, 45 and accompanying text.
70. E.g., Roe, 542 F.3d at 38; Batiste v. City of Beaumont, No. 1:o5-CV-1o9, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21865, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2006).
pi. See Burris v. Thorpe, 166 F. App'x 799, 802 (6th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Latuszkin v. City of
Chicago, 250 F.3d 502 (7 th Cir. 2001); Bama v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (3 d Cir.
1994); Dunton, 729 F.2d at 906-07.
72. E.g., Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Tarpley, 945 F.2d 8o6, 809 (5th Cir. 1991); Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.
1991).
7. See Dunton, 729 F.2d at 907; see, e.g., Medina v. City of Osawatomie, 992 F. Supp. 1269, 1272
(D. Kan. 1998).
74. See Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203, 205 (7th Cir. 1995).
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official, can support qualified immunity.75 Thus, an individual official has
reason to claim he was just following orders given by his superior. 76
Yet if the official asserts such a claim, the plaintiff can often use the
evidence supporting it to show that the municipality had a policy or custom
that caused the deprivation. Indeed, if the superior who gave the order
possessed final policymaking authority with respect to the subject matter at
stake, his orders may constitute a municipal policy because they may reflect "a
deliberate choice to follow a course of action ...made from among various
alternatives."'77 If the orders given by the official with final policymaking
authority were sufficiently broad, they might constitute a delegation of final
policymaking authority to the subordinate official. Under such circumstances,
even the subordinate official's isolated actions in effectuating the orders could
constitute policies on behalf of the municipality. 78 Finally, the claim that the
official was following orders on this occasion could help to establish that other
officials followed these orders on multiple occasions; a court could
consequently characterize the official's conduct as consistent with a custom
under § 1983.
Similar kinds of conflicts can occur if the official claims qualified immunity
because a municipal law or policy permitted or required his conduct, or because
the municipality inadequately trained him for the particular circumstance. Such
claims can assist the official by helping to demonstrate the objective legal
reasonableness of his actions. 79 But the contention that such a policy or
75. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185 (3 d Cir. 2005); Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d
1294, 13o6 (iith Cir. 2OOl); Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriffs Dep't, 228 F. 3d 388 (sth Cir.
2000); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 216 n.1o (2d Cir. 2000); Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d
166, 174 (lst Cir. 2000); Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 85S (8th Cir. 1981); Busche v.
Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7 th Cir. 1981).
76. See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REv. 845, 870 n.102 (2OOl); Christina Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. S, 6o (198o); see also Dina Mishra, Comment,
Municipal Interpretation of State Law as "Conscious Choice": Municipal Liability in State Law
Enforcement, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 249 (2008) (discussing the circumstances under which
municipalities should be held liable for damages for unconstitutional acts when they are "just
following orders"- specifically, when they are required to enforce state law).
77. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Konits
v. Valley Stream Cent. High Sch. Dist., No. ol-CV-6763, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 561o
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2006); Hubbard v. City of Middletown, 782 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Ohio
199o); see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
78. E.g., Diamond v. Chulay, 811 F. Supp. 1321, 1327-28 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see supra notes 43, 45,
and accompanying text.
79. See Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1251-52 (ioth Cit. 2003); Karen M. Blum, Qualified
Immunity: Discretionary Function, Extraordinary Circumstances, and Other Nuances, 23 TOuRo
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inadequate training existed would seriously undermine the municipality's
interests. 8°
These incompatibilities illustrate why dual representation of municipalities
and their officials is likely to produce conflicts of interest. But the
incompatibilities are essentially moot when the municipality bears the cost of
the municipal official's liability-that is, when the municipality completely
indemnifies the municipal official for all damages assessed under § 1983. 8 ' In
such cases, the individual capacity suit against the official becomes
indistinguishable -from a conflicts of interest perspective -from a lawsuit
against the municipal official in his official capacity. This is because complete
indemnification causes the municipality to bear the official's costs of liability as
well as its own. The municipality, therefore, has no reason to assert defenses
that would shift liability off of itself and onto the municipal official, just as the
official has little reason to assert defenses that would shift liability onto the
municipality: either way, the municipality will pay.82
These indemnification arrangements are fairly common. At least twenty-
two states' codes require municipalities to indemnify their officials for liability
under certain conditions."3 At least eight others explicitly permit such
L. REv. 57, 65-81 (2007); Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 508-09 (1993).
8o. See Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418,427 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
81. See Manganella v. Keyes, 613 F. Supp. 795, 799 (D. Conn. 1985).
82. Of course, even with indemnification, municipal officials may face nonpecuniary costs of
liability that municipalities do not, because the officials may lose their jobs and face social
stigma or fewer outside employment opportunities as a result of being found liable under
§ 1983. And municipalities may face public legitimacy costs of liability that officials do not
face. But simply having a different amount or type of stake in the action does not
automatically give rise to a conflict, so long as the attorney has incentive to present the case
in a way that would represent both of his clients' interests. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 & cmt. 23 (2008). Furthermore, the nonpecuniary costs may not be tied to
liability as much as to the mere accusation of the official's alleged wrongdoing, in which case
any approach to resolving conflicts of interest in representation might be too late and
irrelevant to diminish those costs.
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE S 825 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465(a) (West 2008);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-9o3(b)(i) (2004); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-13-3-5 (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 669.21 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109 (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 65.2005 (LexisNexis 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.07 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. §
11-46-7 (LexisNexis 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (2007); NEB. REv. STAT. § 13-1801
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0349 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-A:2
(LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 18
(McKinney 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-04 (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 162
(West 2008); ORP. REv. STAT. § 30.285 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. S 8548(a) (West 2007);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12A-11 (LexisNexis 2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (West 1983);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (2009).
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indemnification.8 4 But permissive indemnification does not fully align the
interests of the municipality and its officials: the municipality may still assert
its own defenses, shift liability to the official, and avoid paying the liability by
ultimately opting not to indemnify. Of course, the individual municipality
separately may be required to indemnify officials pursuant to a municipal
ordinance,"s or by contractual or labor agreements8 6 with officials or their
unions.
Even if indemnification of municipal officials is available from a number of
municipalities, however, it generally is not complete.8 7 At least four states
explicitly prohibit municipalities from indemnifying for punitive damages.88
Moreover, at least sixteen states preclude indemnification for any damages -
compensatory or punitive-if the conduct giving rise to the liability for those
damages meets a particular standard of egregiousness -for example, if it is
"willful," "wanton," "reckless," or "malicious.''2 9
Particularly since juries cannot award punitive damages directly against
municipalities,9" when municipalities do not indemnify for punitive damages,
they have little incentive to vigorously defend officials against such damages, 9'
other than the desire to maintain the officials' morale or to sustain the
84. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-9-22 (2002); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-302 (West 2002); ME.
REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West 2004); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:10-4 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-19-1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-20- 3 10(d) (2000); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 102.002(a) (Vernon 2005).
85. See, e.g., URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. IX, §§ 2-171 to -176 (20o8), available at
http://www.city.urbana.il.us/urbana/city-code/1o2ogooo.htm; NEWTON, MASS., REV.
ORDINANCES § 2-116 (2007), available at http://www.ci.newton.ma.us/LegaV
Ordinance/Chapter-2.pdf; JERSEY CITY, N.J, MUNICIPAL CODE § 27-7 (20o8), available at
http ://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=16o93&sid=30.
86. See, e.g., Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 140-41 (6th Cir. 2003).
87. See Hassan v. Fraccola, 851 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1988); Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88-CV-117 5 ,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4706 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1996).
88. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-302 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109 (1997); N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW§ 18 (McKinney 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 162 (West 20o8).
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465(a) (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-903(c) (2004);
IOWA CODE ANN. 5 669.21 (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2005 (LexisNexis 2004);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112(1)-(2)(A) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9
(West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.07 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305(6) (a)
(2007); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.0349 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-A:2
(LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 41-4-4E (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 18
(McKinney 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 162 (West 2008); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.285
(2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West 2007); TEX. ClV. PRAC. &REM. CODE ANN.
102.002(C) (Vernon 2005).
go. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
91. See Ill. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Ass'n v. Seibert, 585 N.E.2d 1130, 1139 (Ii. App. Ct. 1992).
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municipality's ability to recruit officials in the future.92 Worse, if a municipality
believes it can shift liability from itself to the individual official, and that such
liability would primarily take the form of punitive damages rather than
compensatory damages, which is often plausible, 93 it may have incentive to
argue in ways that favor a finding of unusually egregious behavior on the part
of the individual official. 94  This tactic is particularly tempting for
municipalities, and particularly detrimental for individual officials, because
many municipalities are relieved from the obligation to indemnify the official
for any damages if the court finds that the official acted recklessly, willfully, or
wantonly9s -the same type of finding that would justify imposing punitive
damages on the individual official. 96
Similarly, many states' laws forbid municipalities from indemnifying their
officials for liability attributable to their actions outside the scope of their
employment. 97 Importantly, many facts that would support a finding that an
official was outside the scope of his employment also would support a finding
that he was outside the scope of his official duties, and vice versa.98 As a result,
municipalities experience a triple benefit from presenting evidence that an
individual official was acting outside the scope of his duties and employment:
First, they may undermine the plaintiff's assertion that the official was acting
under the color of law. Second, they may undermine a finding that the official's
actions constituted or were pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Third,
they may escape the obligation to indemnify the official for damages.
Unfortunately for the official, when the municipality pursues such arguments,
it deals the official a double blow: First, he may lose his chance at qualified
immunity. Second, he may lose the guarantee of indemnification.
92. See Mell v. New Castle County, No. 2000 3 -NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *17 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 11, 2003).
93. E.g., Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 17o F.3d 311, 313 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1999); see Alexander
v. Riga, 2o8 F.3d 419, 430 (3 d Cir. 2000); Seibert, 585 N.E.2d at 1139. Of course, in most
cases punitive damages against an official are associated with a large compensatory award
against the municipality, so absent special circumstances municipalities might avoid arguing
in ways that would increase the official's punitive damages.
94. See Seibert, 585 N.E.2d at 1138-39.
95. See id.; supra note 89 and accompanying text.
96. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983); Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68
F.3d 1257, 1263 (ioth Cir. 1995).
97. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465(a) (West 2008); 745 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 10/2-302
(West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-302 (LexisNexis 2006); MASs. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West 2004); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 18 (McKinney 2008); TEx. Civ.
PRAc. &RmM. CODE ANN. S 102.o2(a) (Vernon 2005).
98. See, e.g., Hibma v. Odegaard, 769 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1985).
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This discussion illustrates that municipal indemnification may not fully
align the sometimes-incompatible defenses of denying the existence of a policy
or custom (on behalf of the municipality) and claiming qualified immunity (on
behalf of the individual official). It further illustrates that indemnification
standards may provide municipalities with additional incentives to advocate
positions detrimental to municipal officials. In many cases, therefore, these
incompatibilities create a significant risk that the municipal attorney's ability to
effectively represent his clients will be materially limited. 99 The appropriate
course of action for each defendant if considered individually would be to
assert all available and plausible defenses. But if the attorney dually
representing those defendants asserts all defenses, he risks undercutting one or
both of his clients' chances of success; the evidence provided to support one
client's defense would contradict the evidence provided to support the other
client's defense. Indeed, this "conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that
would otherwise be available to the client"' °° -namely, specific defenses or the
potential success thereof.
Ultimately, there is a real likelihood that conflicting interests will arise in
municipal dual representation. As discussed above, many jurisdictions limit
indemnification in ways that cause the municipality's interests to conflict with
the interests of its officials. In addition, the incompatible defenses discussed
above are central to § 1983 liability. The question of whether a policy or custom
caused the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights is crucial to establishing a
required element of the plaintiff's case for municipal liability and so must come
up in any plausible § 1983 municipal liability suit. The defense of qualified
immunity is frequently asserted and frequently serves as the basis for a
successful individual capacity defense.' All this explains why courts have
declared that conflicts of interest are "inherent" to municipal dual
representation in § 1983 suits.0 2
3. Problems Associated with Rectiying a Concurrent Conflict of Interest
The problems associated with a concurrent conflict of interest in municipal
dual representation are exacerbated if the conflict is permitted to persist. If a
conflict is discovered after representation has been undertaken and it cannot be
cured or waived, the attorney "ordinarily must withdraw from the
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7 cmt. 8 (20o8).
100. Id.
1O. See SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 28, at 46.
102. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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representation. '10 3 Under such circumstances, a municipal attorney usually
withdraws from representing the official and continues to represent the
municipality, since he is employed by the municipality for its purposes. °4 But
"tremendous hardship [is] imposed on the court and all parties alike [when]
separate counsel [has] to be retained in the middle of litigation."' ° If the
municipality does not pay for outside counsel, the official is seriously
burdened, because he may not be able to afford his own attorney, and may
have lost the opportunity to settle the claim or to prepare to represent himself
pro se. Even if the municipality pays, the individual official still must rush to
obtain new counsel and familiarize the counsel with the litigation.
Additionally, when an attorney withdraws after a conflict is discovered, the
withdrawal creates problems relating to confidences previously shared with the
attorney. When an attorney has learned information from a former client, he
may not thereafter reveal or use information relating to the representation to
disadvantage the former client unless the information has become generally
known or the rules of ethics otherwise require or permit the disclosure."06
Instead, he "must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose
representation the [attorney] has withdrawn.' 10 7 But following this command
is particularly difficult when litigation revolves around the former client's
conduct, as is usually the case in municipal § 1983 litigation) °8 These
difficulties are compounded as the litigation advances and discovery is
conducted, because the likelihood increases that large quantities of confidential
information have been shared.'0 9
In some states, municipal attorneys will have additional difficulty
protecting the confidences of former-client officials because of the "joint client"
or "common interest" exception to attorney-client privilege.10  This
exception - which provides that "[w] here two or more clients have retained or
103. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2008).
104. See, e.g., NAPA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.24.050 (2008), available at
http://www.cityofnapa.org/images/cityclerk/MunicipalCode/Tide2/Sections/24/050.pdf; see
also infra Section I.C.
105. Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 87, 89 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
lo6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(C) (2008).
107. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 5.
1o8. See Shadud, 521 F. Supp. at 89; Tell, supra note 18, at 2860.
109. See Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3 d 418, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Miller v.
Alagna, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
11. See Robert B. Cummings, Get Your Own Lawyer! An Analysis of In-House Counsel Advising
Across the Corporate Structure After Teleglobe, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 683, 689-91 (2008);
Nicole Garsombke, Note, A Tragedy of the Common: The Common Interest Rule, Its Common
Misuses, and an Uncommon Solution, 40 GA. L. REV. 615 (2006).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
consulted a lawyer upon a matter of common interest, none of them ... may
claim a privilege" against the other"' - may apply to communications made by
the individual official to the attorney in the course of dual representation.
1' 2
Thus, the attorney may not be able to protect the individual official's
confidential communications if he is subpoenaed to testify about facts relating
to the individual's conduct for the purposes of an indemnification proceeding,
for example.
These problems ultimately may require more than the disqualification of
the municipal attorney from representing the municipal official after a conflict
arises. Indeed, the municipality also may need to reassign the attorney so that
he no longer represents the municipality in the § 1983 suit relating to which he
obtained the individual official's confidences. While the risk of a conflict that
might necessitate the attorney's withdrawal from representing the official poses
potential problems once the litigation begins that compound as the litigation
progresses, the risk may also contribute to broader public policy problems even
before any litigation arises. Specifically, uncertainty about conflicts of interest
and attorney withdrawal may reduce officials' likelihood of taking necessary
risks on the job."3 Because individual officials tend to be risk-averse and may
overestimate the probability of being sued ex ante,11 4 they may react to
additional uncertainty about potential conflicts of interest and attorney
withdrawal by behaving in ways that minimize their risk of being sued at the
expense of the social benefits that their positions were designed to provide. '
C. Municipal Attorneys' Temptations and Pressures To Favor Municipalities
over Municipal Officials
There are a few reasons why municipal attorneys may favor their
municipality clients over their municipal official clients when the clients'
interests conflict. First, law seemingly requires many municipal attorneys to
treat the municipality as their primary client." 6 As a result, municipal attorneys
mii. Zador Corp. N.V. v. Kwan, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
112. See Miller, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1256; Bassett, supra note 18, at 434-35 & n.204.
113. SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 68-77.
114. Id. at 69-70.
11s. Id. at 70-73.
116. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., CrrY CHARTER, art. II, § 272 (2008), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/losangeles.shtnl; Montgomery County v. Walsh, 336
A.2d 97, 113 (Md. 1975); Rinaldi v. Mongiello, 71 A.2d 398, 401 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
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may feel obligated to prioritize the municipality's interests. Furthermore, they
may select defenses to assert based on the notion that disloyalty to the
municipality poses greater personal legal risk (risks of violating ethics rules and
acting contrary to state or municipal law) than does disloyalty to the municipal
official (risk only of violating ethics rules).
Additionally, some courts have decided that in conversations between
municipal officials and municipal attorneys, the municipality is presumed to be
the client for the purposes of attorney-client privilege unless the individual
official clearly claims he is seeking legal advice in his individual capacity. ' Such
holdings may prompt some municipal attorneys to compromise ethical rules
about keeping the confidences of officials who approach them for advice
regarding § 1983 claims: the municipal attorney may claim that she shared the
confidential information with the municipality because the official did not
clearly indicate that he was seeking legal advice for himself rather than on
behalf of the municipality.
Second, municipal attorneys are employed directly by the municipality and
are likely to represent the municipality again in the future. The municipal
attorney's salary and career advancement depend on his ability to please his
superiors, who represent the municipality, not the individual official. The
municipal attorney therefore has "a previously established relationship with
one client, the anticipation of future business from one client, . . . greater
personal identification with one client, . . . [and] the desire to impress one
client on a personal or professional level."'" 8 In addition, the municipal
attorney may feel an allegiance to his colleagues and their work-related goals;
those goals usually will be aligned with the municipality's goals, rather than
the goals of any particular official. In a sense then, the municipal attorney may
feel greater "personal feelings of friendship"119 with the municipality, despite
the fact that, ultimately, that client is a governmental entity rather than a
person.
Of course, most municipal attorneys will be inclined to defend both of their
clients to the best of their ability, based on conscience, a sense of obligation, or
a feeling of professional pride in succeeding in any client's defense. Also,
1949); see also Herrera Memorandum, supra note 6, at i ("In general, the City Attorney has a
single client - the City and County of San Francisco .... ").
117-. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F. 3 d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 2005).
118. Bassett, supra note 18, at 450; cf. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491-
92 (Cal. 1994) (describing how corporate in-house counsel's "inevitably close professional
identification with the fortunes and objectives of the corporate employer" can subject the in-
house attorney to "unusual pressures to conform to organizational goals" that may
irresistibly tempt her to bend ethical norms).
119. Bassett, supra note 18, at 450.
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because the municipality itself has incentives to provide effective representation
to its officials-for example, to maintain officials' good will in ongoing
working relationships, and to maintain its ability to recruit, hire, and retain
other municipal officials12° - those incentives are likely to motivate municipal
attorneys to some extent.
Even so, competing motivations can operate both consciously and
unconsciously on an attorney to favor the municipality. Psychological studies
suggest that self-serving bias can operate to influence even a professionally
trained expert's decisions in favor of his primary client, so long as there is
sufficient ambiguity about the correct choice.12 ' Given the elaborate legal
doctrine surrounding the incompatible defenses available to municipalities and
their officials in § 1983 suits and the complex sets of facts often involved in
these cases, there frequently will be ambiguity about which evidence to present
and when, or how to frame the story of what happened. Similarly, researchers
have found that repeated and close interactions with a client can promote bias
toward that client. 12 1 Municipal attorneys clearly have repeated contact with the
municipality and its representatives, but not much with any particular
municipal official.
Ultimately, however, it is of little importance which type of defendant is
more likely to be harmed. What matters is that municipal dual representation
likely harms the interests of at least one client. Indeed, the underlying problem
with such conflicts of interest is not just that they may cloud municipal
attorneys' judgment and lead them to favor one client over the other. Rather, it
is that the conflicts set up these attorneys for failure: attorneys must either
pursue only one of the incompatible defenses, or must instead present both
and risk turning the jury against both defendants because of the inconsistent
story being presented by the defendants' single attorney or set of attorneys.
"The rule against representing conflicting interests is designed not only to
prevent the dishonest lawyer from fraudulent conduct, but also to prevent the
honest lawyer from having to choose between conflicting duties, rather than to
enforce to their full extent the legal rights of each client.
12 3
120. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman, Kimberly P. Morgan & George F. Loewenstein, The Impossibility
ofAuditor Independence, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1997, at 89.
122. See id.
123. Miller v. Alagna, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255-56 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
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II. EXISTING APPROACHES TO ADDRESS THE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
This Part describes and evaluates the main approaches taken by state ethics
rules, state and municipal laws, and federal and state courts to address the
conflicts of interest that arise from municipal dual representation.
A. Description ofExisting Approaches
Under Model Rule 1.7 and its state equivalents, determining that a conflict
of interest exists is only the first step in ultimately deciding whether an
attorney must be barred from dual representation. Indeed, the rule provides
that a lawyer may continue to represent two clients, despite a conflict, if
particular conditions are met. 4 Specifically, Model Rule 1.7(b) permits
municipal attorneys to dually represent municipalities and their officials so
long as they obtain written informed consent from all clients and reasonably
believe they can provide competent and diligent representation to all clients.125
It is unclear, however, whether the inherent nature of the conflict in such dual
representation makes it unreasonable for an attorney to believe he can serve
both of his clients adequately.
Several state statutes and municipal ordinances prescribe additional
procedures for municipal attorneys to follow when dealing with conflicts of
interest. Because many municipalities are legally obligated to provide for the
defense of their employees under certain conditions, many jurisdictions
provide for the hiring of outside counsel for the individual official, at the
municipality's expense, if a conflict of interest would prevent the municipal
attorney from representing the employee.126  A few laws prohibit
indemnification when the official's defense would create a conflict of interest
between the municipality and the official."2 7
In light of these state and municipal rules, at least thirteen different courts,
including at least four federal appellate courts, have considered the potential
124. See MODEL RULES oF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b) (2008).
125. Id.
126. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. 5 45-9-21(a), (e)(2) (2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.14 , § 8112 (2003);
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw S 18(3)(a), (b) (McKinney 2008); URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES
art. IX §§ 2-173(a), (b) (1998), available at http://www.city.urbana.il.us/urbana/citycode/
10209Ooo.htm; PLANDOME HEIGHTS, N.Y., VILLAGE CODE § 19-3(A), (B) (2oo8), available at
http ://www.plandomeheights-ny.gov/Codes/Defense and Indemnification.htm.
127. E.g., WALDWICK, N.J., MUNICIPAL CODE § 16- 4 (C) (2004), available at
http ://www.waldwickpd.org/code/Chapter%o16.pdf.
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conflicts of interest that can arise from municipal dual representation in § 1983
suits. '28 Numerous other cases have noted the potential for such conflicts.' 29
Generally, courts have adopted or recommended one of three approaches to
address these conflicts of interest. A few have imposed a per se ban on dual
representation in § 1983 claims for damages. At the other extreme, most courts
avoid intervening at all when the conflict is merely potential; these courts
instead "wait and see" whether an actual conflict will materialize, at which time
they permit the representation to continue only if the attorney meets Model
Rule 1.7(b)'s requirements. Finally, a few courts have adopted an intermediate
approach: they permit the attorney to represent both defendants, but require
him to take steps to align their potentially conflicting interests. I will refer to
these three approaches as the "per se ban" approach, the "wait and see"
approach, and the "align the interests" approach, respectively. Also in the mix
is the fact that some courts, mostly those that use the align the interests
approach, have additionally required that the attorney obtain consent from
both the municipality and its official at the beginning of the dual
representation after informing them of the potential for the specific conflicts of
interest prevalent in this area.
1. The Per Se Ban Approach
The per se ban approach is most clearly exemplified by the Eastern District
of Texas decision in Shadid v. Jackson'3° and by Opinion 552 of the New Jersey
128. E.g., Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 344-46 (6th Cir. 2007); Patterson v. Balsamico, 440
F.3d 104, 114-16 (2d Cir. 2006); Galindo v. Town of Silver City, 127 F. App'x 459, 467-68
(ioth Cir. 2005); Hutcherson v. Smith, 908 F.2d 243, 245-46 (7th Cir. 199o); Almonte v.
City of Long Beach, No. CV 04-4192, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at *7-13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2007); Bonneville v. Kitsap County, No. Co6-5228RJB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40200, at
*4-7 (W.D. Wash. June 14, 2006); Arthur v. City of Galena, No. 04-2022, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20148, at *3-11 (D. Kan. June 2, 2004); Kounitz v. Slaatten, 9O1 F. Supp. 650, 658-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Smith v. Daggett County Bd. of Educ., 650 F. Supp. 44, 46-48 (D. Utah
1986); Manganella v. Keyes, 613 F. Supp. 795 (D. Conn. 1985); Clay v. Doherty, 608 F.
Supp. 295, 300-05 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Tex. 1981); In re
Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof I Ethics, 507 A.2d 233
(N.J. 1986).
129. E.g., Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 839-40 (ioth Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Pippin, 74
F.3d 578, 581-83 (5th Cir. 1996); Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Mercurio v. City of New York, 758 F.2d 862, 864-65 (2d Cir. 1985); Richmond
Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d io86, 1o88-9o (4 th Cir. 1982); Van
Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488,495 n.7 (5th Cit. 198o).
130. 521 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
110
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Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, '3 1 which was later
substantially modified by the New Jersey Supreme Court.'3 2 A few scholars
have recommended broader adoption of the per se ban approach.
13
In Shadid, the court found that the facts of the case created an "obvious"
and "serious" potential for a conflict of interest between a city and a city police
officer. 1 As a result of the conflicting defenses available, "an attorney seeking
to represent both of these defendants with utmost zeal might find himself in an
untenable position" and might "find it difficult to protect the confidences of his
individual client while serving the interests of the city. 1 3 The court further
explained that tremendous hardship would be imposed on both it and the
parties if an actual conflict were to materialize and necessitate separate counsel
later in the litigation. As a result, the court required separate counsel before
trial. , 6 In addition, it declared that "[t]he potential for abuse is far too serious
to permit joint representation to continue, even in the face of an apparent
waiver signed by both of these defendants. 13 7 The court lamented that its
decision would prevent the individual litigant from retaining the attorney of
his choice, but it emphasized its obligation to take measures against unethical
conduct in its courtroom and its belief that a waiver could not "cure the
unfairness inherent in the multiple representation of clients with potentially
adverse interests."
138
The decision in Shadid remains unique. Shadid has never been overturned,
but as a district court decision, it lacks precedential value. Additionally, the
decision was based upon the then-current conflict of interest rule in Texas that
has since changed somewhat in phrasing, if not in substance. 3 9 Notably,
Shadid failed to inspire other courts to adopt the per se ban approach; courts
most often cite the case nowadays when they explicitly decline to adopt a per se
ban. 14°
131. 115 N.J.L.J. 96 (1985).
132. See In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, 507
A.2d 233.
133. Bassett, supra note 18; Tell, supra note 18.
134. 521 F. Supp. at 88-89.
135. Id. at 89.
136. Id. at 89-90.
137. Id. at 90.
138. Id.
139. See TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. i.o6 (2008).
140. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (ioth Cir. 1996) (citing
Shadid, 521 F. Supp. at 90).
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In Opinion 552, the New Jersey Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics ruled "that it is never proper for an attorney simultaneously
to represent a governmental entity and any of its officials or employees when
they are co-defendants in [a § 1983] action."' 4 ' The Committee wrote that an
attorney who undertakes such dual representation faces a potential conflict of
interest, and indeed, it believed that such conflicts are "almost invariably
present" in such situations.'42 Consequently, it absolutely prohibited such
multiple representations, deciding that "an ad hoc avoidance of conflicts of
interest on an individual, case-by-case basis was too uncertain and inconsistent
to be the basis for a satisfactory and workable rule."'4 3
Just one year later, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided to
modify Opinion 552's ban. 44 The court first stated that Opinion 552 was
overbroad in barring multiple-client representation in nearly all § 1983 civil
rights actions, and explained that no conflict of interest is likely when
representation of the governmental official is in his official capacity, when only
injunctive relief is sought, or when only compensatory damages are claimed
and the government must indemnify. 4 The court acknowledged significant
potential for conflicts of interest, however, "whenever the claims asserted could
subject the individual defendant to personal liability for which indemnification
is unavailable" -for example, when the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, or
compensatory damages in cases for which municipality need not indemnify.'
46
The court mentioned several other reasons to retreat from the dual
representation ban. First, it declared that multiple representation is a fact-
bound issue best addressed by the individual attorney handling the case.
Second, it noted that the ban imposes "severe financial strains" on local
governments and individual employees who are forced to obtain independent
counsel, and that separate representation imposes an "increased litigational
burden" on courts and the parties.' 47 Third, it explained that the ban gives
opportunistic plaintiffs the chance to improve their bargaining position with
the government defendant by adding many individual defendants to the
lawsuit who would each need to obtain separate counsel (potentially at the
government's expense). In lieu of a per se ban, the New Jersey Supreme Court
141. In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof1 Ethics, 507 A.2d
233, 234 (N.J. 1986).
142. Id. at 235.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 235-36.
146. Id. at 236-37 & n.].
147. Id. at 239-40.
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adopted an approach that is difficult to characterize, as it seems to have features
of the wait and see and align the interests approaches.148
2. The Wait and See Approach
Most federal appellate cases on municipal dual representation have
advanced the wait and see approach.1 49 The approach is popular among federal
district courts as well,"s° and at least one state ethics commission has endorsed
it.i
Under the wait and see approach, courts wait until an actual conflict has
arisen before intervening to require the attorney either to meet the standards of
Model Rule 1.7(b) (or its state equivalent) or to provide separate
representation. While these courts recognize potential conflicts of interest in
dual representation, they conclude that such potential falls short of constituting
an actual conflict that triggers Model Rule 1.7 (b).1 s2 They sometimes reach this
148. Some language in the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision overturning Opinion 552
suggests the court adopted a wait and see approach. See id. at 239. But because the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct bar governmental entities from consenting to conflicts
of interest in representation, see N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7(b)(2) (2009); In re
Petition for Review of Opinion 552, 507 A.2d at 238, the approach differs from a wait and see
approach when a conflict of interest arises because a conflict waiver is not permitted. Rather
than ban all dual representation in that event, however, the court indicated that a
municipality can provide dual representation if it aligns the interests of the municipality and
its official. 507 A.2d at 24o.
149. See, e.g., Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 345-46 (6th Cir. 2007); Patterson v. Balsamico,
44o F.3d 104, 114-16 (2d Cir. 20o6); Galindo v. Town of Silver City, 127 F. App'x 459, 467-
68 (ioth Cir. 2005); Moskowitz v. Coscette, 51 F. App'x 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2002); Rodick v. City
of Schenectady, i F.3d 1341, 135o (2d Cir. 1993); Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1147-48
(7th Cir. 1987).
15o. See, e.g., Almonte v. City of Long Beach, No. CV 04-4192, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at
*18-19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007); Noyce v. City of Iola, No. 89-4o92-R, 199o U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3771, at *2-5 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 199o); Coleman v. Frierson, 607 F. Supp. 1566, 1572-
74 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Clay v. Doherty, 6o8 F. Supp. 295, 303-04 (N.D. I11. 1985); Sherrod v.
Berry, 589 F. Supp. 433,437-38 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
151. See MASS. STATE ETHICS COMM'N, COMMISSION ADVISORY No. 84-03: MUNICIPAL LAWYERS
REPRESENTING BOTH A MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE AND A MUNICIPALITY IN THE SAME SUIT (Sept.
25, 1984), available at http://www.mass.gov/ethics/adv84o3.htm.
152. See, e.g., Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d at 1148; Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (6th
Cir. 1986); Clay, 6o8 F. Supp. at 303. There is an exception: the California state rule
regarding conflicts of interest in litigation prohibits representing clients whose interests only
.potentially" conflict. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(c)(1) (2008).
Consequently, at least one court has decided that "[t]he duty to avoid conflicts arises at the
beginning of the representation" such that the disclosure of the conflict and informed
consent or separate representation must be effected immediately, rather than upon the
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conclusion even when such conflicts of interest seem to fit the definition of a
concurrent conflict of interest under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2)- that is, when the
potential conflict seems to create "a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client."'I 3
For example, in Clay v. Doherty, a case often cited by courts adopting the
wait and see approach,5 4 the Northern District of Illinois stated that "it is for
defendants to choose their own theory of their case, and until it reasonably
appears their choice gives rise to actual and unreasonable conflicts, their choice
of counsel should not be disturbed.' '5 Clay and other cases suggest that it is
not until the defendants have settled upon their ultimate theory of their case,
where their theory clearly includes the assertion of incompatible defenses, that
the potential conflict becomes actual.
As justification for this approach, some courts emphasize that
disqualification of an attorney to represent a particular client is a drastic
measure that should be imposed only when absolutely necessary,' s6 and
highlight the importance of respecting "an individual's right to the counsel of
her choice."' 7 Additionally, they claim that courts are a poor forum for
adjudicating alleged ethical lapses, and that instead federal and state bar
authorities should administer that task. s8 They also cite cases in which
attorneys dually representing municipalities and municipal officials have
vigorously asserted all defenses available to the individual officials despite the
potential conflict, suggesting that it is unlikely that an individual defendant
will actually be prejudiced by any conflict. 59 Through these arguments, the
courts contend that they need not intervene to disqualify an attorney or require
action until an actual conflict, constituted by the defendants' decisions to assert
incompatible defenses, has materialized.
ultimate decision by the defendants as to what defenses to assert. See Miller v. Alagna, 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2008).
154. See, e.g., Gordon, 788 F.2d at 1197-98; Coleman v. Frierson, 607 F. Supp. at 1572.
155. 6o8 F. Supp. at 303-04.
1S6. See, e.g., Noyce v. City of Iola, No. 89-4092-R, 199o U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3771, at *4 (D. Kan.
Mar. 28, 199o); Clay, 6o8 F. Supp. at 303.
157. See, e.g., Almonte v. City of Long Beach, No. CV 04-4192, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007).
158. See Gordon, 788 F.2d at 1199 n.5 ("The bar should be aware of potential ethical violations and
possible malpractice claims."); Almonte, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at *9.
15g. See, e.g., Patterson v. Balsamico, 44o F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2006); Rodick v. City of
Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1350 (2d Cir. 1993).
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3. The Align the Interests Approach
A few courts have declared or suggested that municipal dual representation
may be permitted so long as the municipality takes affirmative steps to align
the interests of the defendants. 6 ' At least two of these courts have declared
that if a municipality "chooses to reduce its legal costs by providing joint
representation," it is necessary that it "take steps to reduce or eliminate" any
potential conflicts of interest.16 1 Some of these courts require the municipality
to completely indemnify the municipal official, such that the municipal
attorney's temptation to favor one defendant over the other is eliminated
because the municipality bears the full cost of either defendant's liability.62
Alternatively, some require the municipality to stipulate to the truth of certain
facts that would eliminate the incompatibility in the defenses -for example,
that the official was acting within the scope of his duties. 63 When these
conditions have not been met by the time the court considers the potential
conflict, the court generally requires that they be met within a short time
period thereafter and attested to by formally filed waivers and affidavits;
otherwise, it will grant the motion to disqualify defense counsel from the dual
representation.16 4 In all of these cases, the municipality and its official could
choose instead to employ separate representation. The courts that impose these
conditions for dual representation justify the imposition by stating that the
conditions are necessary to prevent potential conflicts of interest from
actualizing. 165
160. See Kounitz v. Slaatten, 9O1 F. Supp. 650, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Manganella v. Keyes, 613 F.
Supp. 795, 798 (D. Conn. 1985); Smith v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. io8o (S.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 507
A.2d 233, 240 (N.J. 1986).
161. Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 798; In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552, 5o7 A.2d at 24o.
162. See Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 799; In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552, 507 A.2d at 24o.
163. See Kounitz, 9O1 F. Supp. at 659; Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 797 n.i; Smith v. City of New
York, 611 F. Supp. at io88. In Kounitz, however, the court provided the county attorney with
the option to file the affidavit stating that the individual defendants were acting within the
scope of their employment and duties or to file ex ante specific waivers of the potential
conflicts signed by the individual defendants after being provided with information about
the nature of the potential conflicts. 9O1 F. Supp. at 659.
164. See Kounitz, 9O1 F. Supp. at 659; Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 797.
165. See, e.g., Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 798.
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4. Ex Ante Specific Waivers
Some courts, particularly those that require municipalities to align the
interests of dual representation defendants, have additionally required that any
joint defense attorney obtain an ex ante waiver of the potential conflict early in
the representation, well before the defendants have decided which defenses to
assert.' 66 Based on the application of this requirement by a decision in the
Southern District of New York,' 6, some courts have called this the "Second
Circuit's procedure,""'6 although it has not consistently been applied in recent
Second Circuit cases.' 6 9
Courts that require an ex ante waiver generally require the attorney to
notify the district court and defendants of the potential conflict.'7 °
Additionally, such courts demand that the affected clients be "fully informed of
possible adverse consequences of joint representation,','7 which requires that
the attorney explain to the defendants the "nature of the conflict,"' 2 including
the inherency of the potential conflict' 73 and the specific incompatible
defenses.' 74 The courts also generally require the attorney to inform the
defendant official that "it is advisable that he or she obtain independent
counsel on the individual capacity claim."'7 ' The affidavit filed with the court to
document the official's waiver of the potential conflict must indicate to the
court that the defendant has received adequate notice of and "fully
166. See Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 F. 3d 4 89 , 494 (loth Cir. 1996); Rav. Rossi, No.
1:04CV21O8, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9463, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio May i1, 2oo5); Arthur v. City
of Galena, No. 04-2022-KHV-DJW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *9-1o (D. Kan. June 2,
2004); Kounitz, 9ol F. Supp. 650; Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 796 F. Supp. 84
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Manganella, 613 F. Supp. 795.
167. Kounitz, 9Ol F. Supp. at 659.
168. Johnson, 85 F.3d at 494; Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *9.
16g. See, e.g., Patterson v. Balsamuico, 44o F. 3d 104, 115 (zd Cir. 20o6); Moskowitz v. Coscette, 51
F. App'x 37 (2d Cit. 2002).
170. See, e.g., Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 797.
171. Id. at 799.
172. Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *1o; Kounitz, 9o F. Supp. at 659.
173. Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *1o-11; Kounitz, 9o F. Supp. at 659; Manganella,
613 F. Supp. at 799.
174. See Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *8.
175. Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 494 (loth Cir. 1996); seeArthur, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *9; Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 799.
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understands" the potential conflict,' 76 and that he "has chosen to continue to
retain the municipality's attorney as his counsel."'"
Courts requiring ex ante specific waivers emphasize the importance of
adequately informing the individual defendant so that he can make a wise
choice about whether to accept dual representation. 78 They point to the
explanation in Dunton that an individual defendant, as a layperson, cannot be
expected to understand which defenses he needs to prove or that his counsel
may take positions contrary to his interests, unless informed of these facts.'79
But courts also note that ex ante specific waivers permit the individual official
to choose his own counsel, which is less invasive and more respectful of the
official's preferences. 8°
B. Weaknesses in Existing Approaches
There are several weaknesses in existing approaches to addressing conflicts
of interest in municipal dual representation. The per se ban approach has two
primary weaknesses: it is expensive and inefficient, and it undermines the
litigants' ability to choose their own counsel.
Requiring a per se ban is expensive and inefficient because two different
sets of attorneys must be paid to defend claims predicated on an identical set of
facts and many similar elements. 8 ' Many § 1983 claims are frivolous or easily
disposed of on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 8' Not all such
dispositions would implicate the incompatible defenses: an attorney could
defend both the municipality and its official by claiming that the plaintiff was
not deprived of rights, that the official's conduct did not cause the deprivation,
or that the conduct alleged never occurred, for example. Additionally, a per se
ban imposes significant costs on taxpayers and, in many cases, on the
176. Johnson, 85 F.3d at 494; Kounitz, 9ol F. Supp. at 659; see Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20148, at *1o; Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 799.
177. Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 799; see Ra v. Rossi, No. 1:04CV21o8, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9463, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio May 11, 2005); Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *1o-11;
Kounitz, 9O1 F. Supp. at 659.
178. See, e.g.,Arthur, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20148, at *8.
179. Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1984); e.g., Manganella, 613 F.
Supp. at 799.
i8o. See, e.g., Manganella, 613 F. Supp. at 799.
isi. See In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 507
A.2d 233, 240 (N.J. 1986).
,82. See Fisher v. City of Detroit, No. 92-1759, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23277, at *16 (6th Cir.
Sept. 9, 1993).
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individual officials the ban seeks to protect. Where municipalities are bound to
provide for the official's defense, the cost of hiring outside counsel is
significant, and it is paid on top of the cost of hiring a municipal attorney to
defend the city.' 3 If the municipality is not bound to pay for outside counsel,
the official must pay for counsel himself. In many cases, he will not be able to
afford to do so, and thus he may be faced with the difficult choice between
trying to settle the claim for an amount that he can afford, regardless of the
merits of the underlying lawsuit, or attempting to defend himself pro se.'8 4
Given these unattractive alternatives, many municipal officials might prefer
to be defended by a municipal attorney, despite the potential for conflict. A
municipal attorney may be more experienced and familiar with § 1983 defense,
or may be more talented than the local private sector alternatives.' s5 A
municipal attorney is a particularly attractive alternative when the potential for
conflict is low in light of the facts of the case. Yet the per se ban approach
would deny officials the opportunity to select municipal representation. The
per se ban, therefore, might produce worse outcomes for individual officials,
rather than better ones. Furthermore, the ban's denial of the official's choice
disrespects his autonomy. Given that the official bears such a large stake in the
suit's outcome, he should be able to choose who will represent him.
The wait and see approach has serious weaknesses as well. When municipal
attorneys are not required to warn individual officials upfront about the high
potential for conflicts, there is no guarantee that officials will get the
information they need to make wise choices about their representation.
'8 6
Indeed, unless required to explain the potential conflict, many municipal
attorneys may decline to do so, fearing that such explanation could take
significant time and could undermine the individual defendant's trust in the
lawyer-client relationship. Additionally, some municipal attorneys might be
overconfident about their ability to balance incompatible defenses and obtain
an optimal outcome for both defendants, or about their ability to overcome the
self-serving biases that might cloud their professional judgment. ' There is
183. See In re Petitionfor Review of Opinion 552, 507 A. d at 239-40; Richard C. Solomon, Wearing
Many Hats: Confidentiality and Conflicts of Interest Issues for the California Public Lawyer, 25
Sw. U. L. REV. 265, 316, 327, 329 (1996).
184. See Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 4 89,491 (loth Cir. 1996).
i8s. See Goode-Trufant Interview, supra note 5 (noting that the New York City Law
Department's Special Federal Litigation Division specializes in § 1983 defense of law
enforcement officers).
186. See Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F. 3d 418,427 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
187. Cf Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091-95 (2000)
(describing generally the phenomena of psychological overconfidence and self-serving
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also a risk that unless individual officials receive sufficient advance information
about potential conflicts, they may share confidences with the municipal
attorney that the attorney might later use to their detriment."' in fact, if such
information is disclosed, attorneys may be required to share this information
with representatives of the municipality so that those representatives can make
informed choices about settlement and similar decisions.89
The wait and see approach problematically depends on a private party or an
attorney to bring an actual conflict to the court's attention. Without informing
the municipal official in advance about the potential for conflict and the
defenses that he might wish to assert, the official may not even know if his
attorney has determined not to assert a particular defense on his behalf, or has
decided not to support such a defense with appropriate evidence that the
defendant knows to be available. 9 ' To be sure, the plaintiff might still raise the
issue with the court,' 9' particularly if he has a strategic reason to seek
disqualification of the municipal attorney. ' 92 Some municipal attorneys might
responsibly raise the issue with the court if they think each of the incompatible
defenses is plausible, such that their incompatibility poses an actual conflict.
Yet the individual official, if properly informed, would be far better situated to
police his own interests. His judgment, unlike that of the municipal attorney, is
not clouded by the conflict. Also, he may have access to more evidence that
supports his defense than does the plaintiff, and so would better know whether
his defenses are being shortchanged.
Even after an actual conflict arises, and the municipality and official decide
they wish to assert separate defenses, the wait and see approach continues to
impose costs on the defendants. The defendants must go through the painful
separation process, requiring the court to spend time approving and
monitoring the attorney's withdrawal, allowing the official to obtain new
counsel, and permitting or requiring the municipality to assign new counsel to
itself if shared confidences necessitate such action. Even when an individual
official gives informed consent to the conflict, it is questionable whether one
biases, and their prevalence in various contexts); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997) (same).
188. See supra notes lo6-112 and accompanying text.
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2008).
19o. See Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1984).
191. E.g., Galindo v. Town of Silver City, 127 F. App'x 459, 467-68 (ioth Cir. 2005); Chavez v.
New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 839-40 (loth Cir. 2005); Kounitz v. Slaatten, 9ol F. Supp. 650,
658-6o (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
192. See In re Petition for Review of Opinion 552 of the Advisory Comm. on Profl Ethics, 507
A.2d 233, 24o (N.J. 1986).
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could reasonably believe that the actual conflict will not be problematic; even if
the attorney's judgment is not affected, it may be impossible for him to assert
effectively both defenses.
As for the align the interests approach, requiring a municipality to make
major commitments at the start of every dual representation is excessive.
Requiring complete indemnification in all cases would impose extremely
significant costs on taxpayers for some actions that are egregious, willful, or
malicious, and ultimately the individual defendant's fault alone. In addition, it
could create moral hazard problems wherein some municipal officials might
see less reason to avoid conduct that deprives a citizen of protected rights. Even
worse, a few municipal officials with bad intentions might be willing to
commit even more egregious actions than they would otherwise, because the
municipality would be bound to indemnify them.193
Similarly, if the municipality must stipulate early in the litigation to facts
that would obviate the incompatibility in the defenses, it cannot make a choice
adequately informed by the evidence. Early on, the municipality may have only
partial information about whether the official was acting within the scope of
his duties. The full evidence is not revealed until discovery begins, particularly
because the official may have misrepresented what occurred. Requiring the
municipality to stipulate to facts that ultimately might be false is not in the
interests of the court, which seeks to determine the truth of what occurred.
And from a broader social perspective, resolving cases on ultimately untrue
stipulations is problematic because doing so makes it difficult for voters to
know whether deprivations of federal rights were caused by widespread or
high-level policies or customs of the municipality, or whether they were
instead caused by a rogue official. Providing accurate information to the
electorate in these § 1983 cases serves the statute's tort function of deterring
violations of constitutional and federally protected rights, '94 by permitting the
voters to hold the proper authorities accountable.
The ex ante specific waiver, in contrast, seems to be a particularly useful
tool. By informing the individual defendant of the potential conflict, the waiver
permits him to monitor his representation to ensure it is appropriately
advancing defenses and evidence available to him. Ex ante specific waivers cost
193. See Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation:
Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91 (1996) (discussing generally the problem
of moral hazard when tortfeasors are indemnified for their liability, including liability for
gross negligence).
194. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 495 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (198o).
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relatively little' 95 and are easy to administer once developed. They preserve the
litigants' rights to choose their counsel and simultaneously ensure better
choices of counsel.
Nonetheless, such waivers cannot make incompatible defenses compatible.
Thus, there are situations in which individual defendants might agree to an ex
ante waiver, and even to an ex post waiver once an actual conflict exists, but the
conflict of interest may still be irreconcilable, with the result that it undermines
the proper determination of liability. There are broader social interests in
avoiding litigation when an attorney operates under a concurrent conflict of
interest that inevitably compromises his representation of one or both clients:
first, an interest in determining the truth, so that remedial actions can be taken
to address the actual cause of the deprivation of rights, thereby preventing
future violations;, 6 and second, an interest in using the adversarial system as
the best means to determine that truth, rather than relying on an individual
attorney's own balancing of conflicting interests among his clients in the
absence of (and prior to) the plaintiffs presentation of the facts before a
court.1 9 7 In some cases, then, an ex ante waiver is insufficient.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
The following proposal seeks to take the best features of the existing
approaches while avoiding some of their most fundamental weaknesses.
The proposal first recommends requiring ex ante specific waivers,
accomplished after an explicit upfront inquiry and information session by the
municipal attorney. At the session, the attorney should determine the
likelihood that defenses will conflict in the particular case, and should
communicate that likelihood- along with information about the nature of
potential conflicts of interest-both to the individual official and to the
municipality.
A similar inquiry occurs already on the federal level, when federal
government attorneys handle a Bivens claim filed against an individual federal
official that is predicated on similar facts as a Federal Tort Claims Act claim
195. See Miller v. Alagna, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
196. See supra note 194.
197. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1367, at 27 (2d ed. 1923) (describing cross-examination's role in our system and stating
that it "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth"); Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57
(1998) (discussing the benefits of adversary-based fact presentation).
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simultaneously proceeding against the federal government. Federal regulations
explicitly require that, upon receiving an official's request for representation,
"the litigating division shall determine whether the employee's actions
reasonably appear to have been performed within the scope of his employment
and whether providing representation would be in the interest of the United
States." ' 98 The Department of Justice (DOJ) takes very seriously the
determination of whether representation of an individual employee meets the
"scope and interests" inquiry.' 9 9 Generally, the employing agency will forward
all available factual information to the DOJ along with a recommendation as to
whether the representation meets the "scope and interests" inquiry.200 Federal
government attorneys, who are bound by the same state rules of ethics that
bind municipal government attorneys," ' often use the initial "scope and
interests" inquiry to determine not only whether federal attorneys'
representation of the individual official is consistent with the United States's
interests, but also whether such representation is likely to produce conflicts
that harm the individual employee's interests.Y The government can still
withdraw from representation later if it determines that representing the
official is not in fact within the interests of the United States, 0 3 but the initial
required inquiry into the interests of the two clients makes later withdrawal far
less likely to occur.
Many municipalities implement a similar initial inquiry for the purpose of
determining whether representation may or must be offered under state or
municipal law. For example, New York City attorneys must initially determine
whether the individual defendant "was acting within the scope of his public
employment and in the discharge of his duties and was not in violation of any
rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged act or omission
occurred" in order to decide whether to represent him.0 4 This inquiry helps to
reduce the likelihood that facts will later come to light that might encourage
the City to vigorously argue that the individual employee was acting outside
the scope of his duties. But the City's approach does relatively little to answer
198. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(2) (2008).
199. Telephone Interview with Zachary Richter, Att'y, Constitutional Torts Staff, Torts Section,
Civil Div., Dep't of Justice (Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Richter Interview].
zoo. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEys' MANUAL § 4 -5.412(C)(1)
(1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-roo/usam/title4/
5mciv.htm#4-5.412; see Richter Interview, supra note 199.
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 53oB(a) (2006).
2o2. See Richter Interview, supra note 199.
203. See id.
2o4. N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 5 o-k(2) (McKinney 2007).
iic9:86 2009
MUNICIPAL DUAL REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
questions about potential conflicts stemming from disputes about whether the
individual was following orders or acting on the basis of a city policy, custom,
or inadequate training. As a result, attorneys for municipalities like New York
City should be required to take a broader view in their initial inquiry, inquiring
generally into the question of whether it is in the interests of both clients for
the municipal attorney to represent the individual rather than hiring outside
counsel. In addition, that inquiry should focus on whether there is significant
likelihood that the conflicts discussed above will materialize.
The federal government's prompt information requirement provides a
good starting point for my proposal about providing advance information to
individual defendants about the potential conflict. Upon determining that the
federal attorney will represent the official, federal regulations explicitly require
the attorney to promptly inform the official of several important features and
limitations of the representation: (i) that the DOJ must represent the United
States and the official and that the attorney will assert all appropriate and legal
defenses on behalf of the United States and the official;2 °s (2) that the attorney
will not assert any defenses on behalf of the official that are not in the United
States's interests;26 and (3) that while no conflict yet seems to exist, if such
conflict should arise the attorney will promptly advise the official and take
specific steps to resolve it." 7 This upfront information is extremely helpful to
the individual defendant, as it makes him aware of the risks associated with
government representation.
A few large municipalities have developed ex ante form waivers that must
be executed by individual officials upon the outset of their representation by
the municipal attorney. These waivers provide similar information to that
required at the federal level. For example, the New York City form waiver
states that "[tihe Corporation Counsel's Office functions primarily as the
City's lawyer, and its principal obligation is to represent the City's interests.
'' 8
It also mentions generally the potential for conflicts of interest and the steps
205. 28 C.F.R. § 5o.15(a)(8)(i) (2008).
206. Id. § 5o.15(a)(8)(ii).
207. Id. § 5o.15(a)(8)(v). The attorney must explain the specific steps that are taken in the event
of a conflict of interest, which are outlined elsewhere in the regulations. See id. § 5o.15(a)(6),
(9), (10); id. § 50.16.
2o. Letter from Gary Shaffer, Ass't Corporate Counsel, Tort Div., N.Y. City Law Dep't, to Anne
Pejovich 1 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.parentadvocates.org/nicemedia/
documents/contract.pdf [hereinafter Pejovich Waiver].
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that would be taken to resolve them. 2°9 In addition, it discusses the terms of
indemnification, including the exception for intentional wrongdoing.1
Even so, it appears that the New York City waivers for representation
offered to employees in § 1983 suits do not discuss the specific nature of the
conflicts of interest that are most likely to arise, including the specific
incompatible defenses available to the City and to the officials.1 Nor do they
mention that the City will not advance defenses contrary to its interest.2 2 This
Note proposes to require municipalities to inform their individual clients about
the primacy of the government client, the government attorney's inability to
assert defenses contrary to the government's interest, the general potential for
conflicts of interest, and steps that would be taken to resolve such conflicts. Yet
that is not all it would mandate. More stringently, it advises that courts require
municipal attorneys to obtain ex ante specific waivers in which they inform
individual officials of the nature and likelihood of the specific available
defenses that may be incompatible, and to obtain a written affidavit from each
official indicating that he fully understands and wishes to be represented by the
municipal attorney regardless. 13
zo9. Id.
210. Id. at 1-2.
211. See, e.g., id. (neglecting to mention the potential conflicts between the City's policy or
custom defense and the individual employee's qualified immunity defense); see also Combier
v. Biegelson, No. 03 CV 10304, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3056, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2005)
(confirming that the case in which this individual city employee was represented involved
§ 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity and against the City of New York);
Elizabeth Betsy Combier, Advocacy Comes with a Steep Price-Maybe Too
Steep, PARENTADvOCATES.ORG, http://www.parentadvocates.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
article&articlelD=3727 (last visited Sept. 6, 2009) (providing further information about the
case from the plaintiffs perspective).
212. Pejovich Waiver, supra note 208.
213. Ex ante waivers could have limited effectiveness if municipal officials lack knowledge of, or
ability to understand, the legal content of such waivers, see Bassett, supra note 18, at 437
n.215, or if they feel pressure to sign the waivers to retain their municipal employment. Still,
such waivers, rather than per se bans on dual representation, preserve litigant choice and
permit cost-efficient dual representation in cases where conflicts are unlikely to arise.
Furthermore, requiring specific ex ante waivers -through which officials are informed of the
particular incompatible defenses available to them and the municipality- improves the
likelihood that their consent to dual representation will be fully informed. While individual
officials are far from the most sophisticated of legal clients, they at least may have more
experience with the law than the average citizen, because those who tend to be sued under
§ 1983 are generally involved in applying one or more areas of the law on a daily basis. See
Lewis A. Kornhauser, A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REv.
747, 750 (1998) (explaining that administrative officials like police officers and social
workers often must apply the law). Thus they likely are more capable of understanding the
nature of their legal defenses and the content of an ex ante waiver if both are explained by
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If such an ex ante specific waiver is signed, this Note proposes that dual
representation should be permitted even if there is a "significant risk" that the
defendants would reasonably wish to assert conflicting defenses. If the
individual defendant refuses to sign the waiver, however, dual representation
should not continue and the individual defendant must obtain separate
counsel. In that event, when the municipality is required by law to provide
outside counsel to the official in the event of a conflict, and the likelihood that
the defendants would reasonably wish to assert incompatible defenses given
the information available constitutes a "significant risk,"2 1 4 the court should
treat the situation as a concurrent conflict of interest and require the
municipality to choose between two options: (i) provide outside counsel, or
(2) take affirmative steps to eliminate the possibility of the incompatible
defenses by "aligning the interests" of the defendants, as the previous Part
discussed. When the likelihood that the defendants will reasonably wish to
assert incompatible defenses is low, however, the court should decide that the
municipality need not provide outside counsel because no conflict of interest
yet exists, with the result that the individual must pay for his own counsel if he
chooses separate representation.215 If the official chooses dual representation,
the attorney. Cf. Michael J. DiLernia, Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large Law
Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 134-35 (2009) (discussing sophisticated clients and
advance waivers of conflicts). As for the possibility of employment pressure that may induce
the waiver, at a minimum, this Note's proposal protects officials when a municipality and an
official choose to assert directly conflicting defenses, because it requires separate
representation or alignment of interests (and does not permit a conflict waiver) under those
circumstances. And prior to that point, the often greater risk of personal liability produced
by municipal dual representation may outweigh the slighter pressure the official faces to
select municipal representation in order to please the municipal employer.
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2008).
215. One could argue that cities should be obligated from the start of the litigation to pay for
outside counsel for an official who prefers it, so that no uncertainty about eligibility for
continued municipal representation or payment of legal expenses would exist to undermine
the quality of officials' day-to-day policy decisions. See supra notes 113-115 and
accompanying text. Yet most state and municipal laws governing the municipal obligation
to pay for outside counsel impose that obligation only in the event of a conflict of interest,
see supra note 126 and accompanying text, and a conflict of interest exists in this context only
if there is a "significant risk" that the attorney's representation of either client will be
materially limited, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2008). Such a "significant
risk" may not arise until later in the litigation, because at the outset it may be probable that
the dual representation could rely solely on a defense consistent with both the municipality's
and its official's interests (for example, the defense that no constitutional violation
occurred). Thus, it seems inappropriate for a state or federal court to require the
municipality to pay for outside counsel before the "significant risk" arises, although it might
be wise policy to revise state or municipal law to require municipalities to offer the official
the option of outside counsel at the municipality's expense regardless of whether a conflict
of interest has arisen.
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from that point on the court should adopt a wait and see approach, remaining
vigilant to the possibility that the potential for the conflicting defenses to be
asserted could become a "significant risk."
This proposal for handling the potential for conflicts of interest at the
outset takes the best of the ex ante specific waiver, wait and see, and align the
interests approaches. The proposal preserves litigant choice by permitting the
individual defendant to consent to a conflict that may never materialize. It
avoids the significant expense associated with requiring separate representation
in all S 1983 cases in which both a municipality and its official are defendants.
It also avoids requiring alignment of interests too early in the litigation, when a
municipality might commit to costly and overbroad indemnification that could
cause moral hazard, or might stipulate to facts that bear a significant likelihood
of being untrue. By only requiring alignment when a significant risk of conflict
has emerged, this proposal makes it more likely that the municipality's choice
of how to align, and whether to align (rather than opt for separate
representation), will be informed by additional fact development. Indeed,
under this proposal, a "significant risk" of conflicting defenses generally would
not exist unless facts were available to suggest it. Furthermore, the proposal
protects individual defendants by informing them at the outset of the specific
conflicting defenses, which enables them to be vigilant in monitoring their
representation by the municipal attorney. It also protects such defendants by
ensuring that if conflicting defenses are sufficiently likely to be asserted, action
will be taken either to preclude those conflicting defenses (stipulating as to
facts) or to dissipate their potential harm (committing to complete
indemnification).
However, if at any time it becomes apparent that the defendants definitely
intend to assert incompatible defenses, the calculus changes. Under such
circumstances, whether they arise early or late in the litigation, courts should
decide that it is unreasonable to believe that the attorney can provide
competent and diligent representation to both clients within the meaning of
Model Rule 1.7(b)(1).21 6 An attorney cannot be expected to capably advocate
for two opposing findings on a single factual question, and hence cannot be
expected to successfully advance two clients' interests when they have decided
to assert incompatible defenses. If the likelihood of conflicting defenses reaches
that point of complete certainty, the defendants should not be permitted to
waive the conflict by giving informed consent. Instead the court should give
the municipality the same choice it would have in the event of a "significant
risk" that incompatible defenses would be asserted, with the exclusion of the
option to obtain a conflict waiver: the municipality should choose between (1)
216. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b)(i) (2008).
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providing outside counsel if required by law (or permitting separate counsel
paid for by the official, if the municipality is not obligated by law to pay); or
(2) curing the conflict by aligning the interests of the defendants (assuming
that state and municipal law would permit the required alignment).217
This proposal, therefore, carefully balances interests to determine when
individual officials should be permitted to consent to conflicts of interest.
Litigant choice should be preserved, and is to the extent possible by this
proposal. But other interests are at stake as well. As described above, the court
and broader society have reasons not to permit an attorney to advance directly
conflicting defenses. The court has an interest in establishing the truth of what
occurred, and in establishing it through an adversarial proceeding in which the
adversity and determination of truth occurs between the attorneys before the
court, not within one.218 As a result, this proposal optimally permits litigants to
have their choice of counsel when the risk that defendants will wish to assert
conflicting defenses is merely significant, but does not permit the individual
municipal official defendant to consent to the certain simultaneous assertion of
two directly conflicting defenses. 9
CONCLUSION
This Note discusses the issue of conflicts of interest in municipal attorneys'
dual representation of municipalities and their officials in § 1983 suits for
damages. The Note explains the potentially severe consequences of this
problem, particularly for individual defendants, and the broader implications it
has for public accountability and consequently for the prevention of rights
deprivations. Yet the problem has been largely ignored thus far. Only a handful
of cases address the issue, but the frequency of § 1983 litigation involving
217. For two reasons, it is not enough to apply an approach whereby different attorneys within a
municipality's legal department would represent the official and the municipality in the face
of a clear conflict in intended defenses, with an ethical wall erected between the attorneys so
that neither is privy to information about the other's client. First, many smaller
municipalities' legal departments employ no more than a handful of attorneys, making it
difficult to isolate each attorney and his client's information. Second, because most
municipal attorneys are frequently engaged in litigating on behalf of the municipality, and
because their continued employment depends on the municipality's satisfaction with their
work, a municipal attorney representing a municipal official may face difficulty setting aside
his allegiance to the municipality in order to represent the official's interests when the two
directly conflict. See supra Section I.C.
218. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
219. Only one court's approach resembles my hybrid approach. The Southern District of New
York, in Kounitz v. Slaarten, 9Ol F. Supp. 65o, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), permitted the
municipality to either align the interests or obtain an ex ante specific waiver.
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municipal defendants and the difficulty of determining whether an individual
official's defenses have been shortchanged suggest that many more cases have
been affected.
Municipal attorneys may be permitted to proceed despite significant
potential conflicts of interest for many reasons. Because taxpayers bear the
costs of § 1983 judgments against cities and counties and information about
many of the largest such judgments is salient, the public may react quickly and
angrily when a municipal attorney loses a § 1983 suit on behalf of the
municipality. But the public may be less concerned about the importance of a
vigorous defense for the municipal official, who as an individual may be easier
to vilify for his conduct. While there are broad social benefits to providing a
strong defense for a municipal official, these benefits are delayed and less
salient, which may account for the public's lack of concern on the issue. For
example, the long-term and subtle benefits to providing a strong defense
include maintaining the good will and morale of current municipal officials,
the ability to recruit officials who otherwise would fear liability or the stigma of
losing a § 1983 claim, and the likelihood that the ultimate court decision will
reflect underlying realities and hold proper authorities responsible for rights
deprivations. These benefits operate through complex mechanisms that are
easily overlooked by members of the public.
Consequently, one scholar writes that "government lawyers [are] accorded
significantly more latitude to continue to represent clients in the face of alleged
concurrent and former client conflicts than is the case with regard to private
practitioners."' But this is simply not appropriate. Municipal attorneys, as
government actors, should be held to higher standards, not lower ones, than
private sector attorneys, because of their duty to serve the general public
interest."'
This Note, therefore, offers a proposal to balance the many interests at
stake in this question. Courts should ensure that municipal attorneys
communicate upfront the potential for the specific conflicts of interest in dual
representation of municipalities and their officials in § 1983 suits for damages.
Courts should also require individual officials to indicate their understanding
of these potential conflicts and their desire to be represented by municipal
counsel before dual representation can begin. Officials should have the option
220. Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations That Follow from Civil Government
Lawyers' General Duty To Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 47 (2003).
221. See People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1985); Steven K.
Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the
Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789 (2000); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in
the Legal Profession, 94 HA.V. L. REv. 1244, 1421 (1981).
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to consent to a "significant risk" that incompatible defenses will or should be
asserted, in order to preserve their choice of counsel. But if they decline to
consent, separate counsel or the municipality's actions taken to align the
interests and cure the conflict are necessary to ensure that individual officials
can assert all defenses to which they are entitled. Finally, if the defendants
ultimately reach an impasse in that each wishes to assert his or its own
incompatible defense, courts should not permit waiver of that actual conflict.
Municipal attorneys should not advocate fundamentally inconsistent positions
in the same litigation, because permitting them to do so would undermine the
forum of the court and its ability to properly determine truth and assign
liability.
I~r
